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SYMPOSIUM
International Bank Supervision
Post BCCI

JOSEPH

J.

NORTON*

Introductory Observations
As the domestic dust of Parliamentary and independent (Bingham) enquiries
and Bank of England bashing subsides in the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) debacle, we will undoubtedly see new United Kingdom
(U.K.) banking legislation and enhanced U.K. supervisory practices (t la the
secondary banking crises and Johnson Matthey affair), as we just have witnessed
substantial revisions of the United States (U.S.) banking law and practices under
the 1991 Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA). Enhanced supervisory activity and pronouncements will also be apparent within the Basle
Committee on Bank Supervision, the European Community, and within the
national banking systems of many other jurisdictions.
The pervasive and gnawing dilemma left by BCCI is not primarily a domestic
question of bank fraud, money laundering, and bank regulation and supervision.
Rather, it is a question of the necessity, nature, and viability of the incipient
network of international bank supervision emanating from the Basle Committee
of Bank Supervisors and the coordination of this evolving international supervisory framework with the revamped U.S. system of foreign bank supervision,
the newly unfolding EC framework, and the yet-to-be enhanced U.K. and other
national frameworks.
*Editor-in-Chief, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER; Cameron Markby Hewitt Professorial Fellow in
Banking Law at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, University of London; Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University; Of Counsel, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas. These observations are

derived, in part, from Professor Norton's concluding remarks to his presentation on international
bank supervision at a recent Euromoney Conference on the "BCCI Aftermath."
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Beyond this complex, multidimensional matrix of international bank supervision post BCCI, one can discern certain preliminary lessons:
International Banking Supervision
Though BCCI involved the failure of a $20 billion financial institution (with
third-party exposure in the United States having been limited to $25 million), it
does not appear that such failure, even if left unattended by the international
regulators, would have created any serious systemic problems for the international banking community. Nevertheless, it is clear that for London, New York,
and other world financial markets to continue to prosper there must be a level
playing field to instill integrity and confidence on a global basis.
This decade will further demonstrate that we are in a global financial market
transcending national and regional boundaries. Increasingly, supervisors will be
required to act jointly if they are to create and to preserve integrity in what has
become a worldwide banking system.
Consolidated Supervision
For several decades the international bank supervisors of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) jurisdictions have been aware
of significant gaps in international supervision and have developed principles of
consolidated supervision under the original and 1983 Revised Basle Concordats,
as further revised.
The BCCI utilization of affiliated bank holding company structures in jurisdictions self-admittedly incapable of any effective consolidated supervision
(Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands) and the operation of a hidden "bank
within a bank" revealed glaring supervisory gaps. The new EC Consolidated
Supervision Directive and recent pronouncement by the Basle Committee should
go a long way in closing these remaining loopholes (though, most likely, all gaps
cannot be sealed).
But the realities of consolidated supervision operate on national levels and
require effective coordination and convergence of regulatory and supervisory
standards and flows of quality information between home and host country
regulators. The recent U.S. statute and regulations on foreign bank supervision
incorporate the principles of "effective" consolidated supervision into the application, termination, and examination processes for foreign banks.
Home Country Regulation
The principle of home country regulation as espoused by the Basle Committee
and the EC Second Directives should not be abandoned. Nevertheless, what
BCCI makes clear is that home country supervision only makes sense where that
jurisdiction has (i) comparable supervisory standards, (ii) a capacity to impleVOL. 26, NO. 4
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ment and enforce such standards, and (iii) a deposit insurance or lender-of-last
resort dimension, or both.
As 1993 comes upon us, the EC authorities will undoubtedly rethink and refine
the "mutual recognition" vehicle for convergence of national supervisory standards. The U.S. authorities have already given their Federal Reserve the powers
to step into the breach where home country supervision is unfeasible or inadequate, and the issue of "reopening" (that is, requiring foreign banks to establish
subsidiaries and not branches) still is open.
The International Institutional Structure
The recent Key and Scott Report of the Group of Thirty has pondered possible
international supervisory structures, and some commentators even suggest a
multilateral treaty approach. What appears realistic and feasible is a continuing
maturation and enhancement of the currently informal Basle Committee structure
so that this vehicle can assume a broader role in the overall convergence process
of supervisory standards; in the assembly, coordination, analysis, and dissemination of relevant supervisory information; in the uniform interpretation of the
standards and practices; and in the ultimate surveillance of national jurisdiction
compliance and effective implementation.
The Basle Committee also most probably will accelerate its attempts to influence and to assist the practices of non-OECD bank supervisors and its dialogue
with international securities supervisors. On an EC level, it is probable that when
European monetary union approaches there will also be proposals for an umbrella EC bank supervisory authority appended to the new EC Central Bank. On
a national level, effective linkages will need to be created between national
authorities, regional authorities, and the Basle Committee.
Transparency and Disclosure
Secrecy and confidentiality traditionally are ingrained in the temperament of
bankers and central bankers. However, this can lead to an opaque system as
witnessed by the BCCI affair. A radical review of the possibility that greater
transparency (not only on a supervisory level, but on public and marketplace
levels) is what is needed in a somewhat similar way as it was needed with
securities firms and markets. Clearly, there needs to be a better informed and
more transparent international banking system respecting both quantitative and
qualitative data and respecting an appropriate international vehicle for digesting,
evaluating, and disseminating such information.
Role of Auditors
Related to the issue of transparency is the proper role of auditors in the
supervisory processes. In BCCI we found different auditors auditing different
WINTER 1992
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affiliated entities under differing national auditing standards. For a consolidated
and transparent supervisory network, this situation cannot be permitted.
But though it may be possible to require one reputable independent auditor for
an affiliated group, or at least a coordination of audits, it will be a long-term
project to try to harmonize or converge the disparate accounting and auditing
principles and standards existing worldwide (though the Basle Committee and
the IACPA have begun this dialogue). Also, the relationship of the auditors to the
bank regulators and the depositors will need to be thought through carefully and
comprehensively.
Legalism
Because of the complexities of the issues, the multiplicity of the parties
involved, the needs for transparency and fairness of application, and the inherent
"culture" of various jurisdictions (for example, the United States and certain
continental countries), greater legalism will creep into international and EC bank
regulation. Such legalism has been anathema to the Bank of England, which
prefers the more informal method of "moral suasion" and participative discussions with relevant parties. However, it was in part this inability to come to terms
with the legalism of the U.K. 1987 Banking Act and an apprehension of judicial
review that stymied the Bank from acting sooner and more decisively.
Certainly, the density of regulation as in the United States is not a desired
international norm. Nevertheless, some reasonable level of legalism in bank
regulation and supervision is needed to ensure transparency, uniformity of application, and fairness within the international banking system.
Insolvency Laws
Multilateral work will need to be encouraged respecting acceptable international solutions to transnational insolvencies such as BCCI. Such attempts have
proven to be protracted and most difficult, as can be seen in the efforts to
harmonize EC bankruptcy laws. These attempts become further aggravated when
dealing with financial institutions. But for an international supervisory network
to work at an optimum level, such problems will need to be addressed on a
regional and broader multilateral basis.
Enforcement
An international supervision network cannot ensure effective national supervision on a ground level or prompt an effective national enforcement action.
These aspects will remain in the hands of national authorities. As such, the final
chain of international supervision will always be subject to the problem of weak
or uncoordinated national links in the chain. However, more and better cooperation between the Basle Committee, the EC authorities, and the dominant naVOL. 26, NO. 4
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tional authorities (for example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan) can promote better national enforcement and examination
practices.
Perhaps the efforts of the Bank of England and the ad hoc "college" of
international supervisors in BCCI were too little, too late. But the broader observation is that the only feasible approach was through a working international
network of cooperating supervisors. Over this coming decade, something better
than this ad hoc crisis-oriented approach will emerge, with the EC and the U.S.
efforts in the area serving as centrifugal forces for international reform.
This Symposium
With this backdrop, The InternationalLawyer presents this Symposium section on "International Bank Supervision Post BCCI." Professor Dale, one of the
leading commentators on international bank supervision over the past decades,
presents a perspective on the BCCI affair and its broader implication from the
vantage point of what turned out to be the "practical seat" of this supervisory
nightmare. Then Messrs. Corrigan et al. of the Federal Reserve System carefully
elaborate (based on congressional testimony) upon BCCI and the U.S. FBSEA.
FBSEA not only raises the delicate balance between international collaborative
supervisory principles and efforts and the possibilities of unilateral, national
protective standards and actions, but also presents significant challenges and
adjustments to the traditional "dual banking" system of foreign bank regulation
in the United States. The conclusions and recommendations of Mr. Heimann's
report to the New York State banking commissioner are germane on this latter
point of consequences.
Next, Messrs. Gail et al. summarize the primary thrust and main provisions of
FBSEA, and Mr. Whitener analyzes the April 1992 interim regulations of the
Federal Reserve Board implementing FBSEA.
Notwithstanding the exaggerated image BCCI forged for all foreign banks,
what needs to be remembered is that most foreign bank operations in the United
States have been conducted responsibly and have provided significant economic
benefits for the U.S. economy over the past decade. Mr. Hand speculates on the
additional burdens the new U.S. statute and regulation place on foreign banks
doing business in the United States.
Future issues of TIL will publish "recent development" articles respecting
further developments in the area of international bank supervision.

WINTER 1992

